The office sector has absorbed more negative narrative than any other corner of commercial real estate over the past five years. Remote work, hybrid mandates, sublease waves, distressed loan maturities, and a cascade of institutional write-downs have made "office" a word that requires qualification in almost any capital conversation. The story the market tells about itself is one of structural decline — a sector that overbuilt for a pre-pandemic world and now faces the long reckoning.
That story is not wrong. But it is incomplete, and the part it leaves out is where the actual opportunity lives.
National office vacancy closed 2025 at approximately 20.5 percent, according to Cushman & Wakefield — the highest level in modern recorded history and a figure that, taken in isolation, looks like a sector in freefall. But the headline disguises what is actually happening at the asset level, and asset level is where leases get signed and capital gets deployed. Beneath that 20.5 percent aggregate sits a market that has split so completely into two parallel realities that calling it a single market is itself a kind of analytical error. Trophy office in the right submarkets is approaching full occupancy and generating all-time-high rents. Legacy Class B and C product in the wrong markets is, in some cases, approaching functionally uninvestable vacancy levels. The bifurcation is not a temporary feature of a stressed cycle. It is the new permanent structure of the sector, and investors who underwrite it as a monolith will be wrong in both directions — too pessimistic on the assets that are genuinely recovering, and too optimistic on the assets that are not.
This is among the most consequential dynamics across the 20 CRE sectors BestCRE covers, and it sits at the intersection of Asset Classes, Market Analytics, and Underwriting.
The Bifurcation Was Always the Story
The framing of "office recovery" has consistently obscured more than it reveals, because it implies that the sector moves as a unit — that a rising tide will eventually lift all buildings in all markets. The data from the past several years argues conclusively against that framing. The recovery, such as it is, has been concentrated with unusual precision in the top tier of assets in a specific category of market.
CBRE research puts the vacancy differential between trophy product and the broader market at approximately 500 basis points. That gap has not been narrowing — it has been widening. And the mechanism is not complicated: companies that have settled into hybrid work as a permanent operating model have become intensely selective about which office environments they are willing to require their employees to come to. The office that workers will actually show up for is not the one that offers the best rent. It is the one that offers the best experience — amenity density, transit access, building technology, air quality, design quality, and a sense that the landlord has invested in the asset as a workplace rather than simply a container for employees. Buildings that deliver those things are generating strong leasing velocity. Buildings that do not are struggling to fill even at steep concessions.
By conservative estimates from CBRE, vacancy in prime buildings is expected to return to its pre-pandemic rate of approximately 8.2 percent by 2027. That figure, for any asset class, would represent a functioning landlord’s market — tighter than many suburban multifamily markets and approaching the conditions that produce genuine rent growth. But that trajectory belongs exclusively to top-tier product. The same analysis does not extrapolate to Class B or C assets; those submarkets are in a different conversation entirely, one that increasingly involves conversion economics and repositioning capital rather than traditional leasing fundamentals.
Trophy Office Is a Seller’s Market Inside a Buyer’s Market
The clearest evidence of bifurcation is visible not just in vacancy but in transaction pricing, leasing velocity, and the behavior of institutional capital. In Manhattan, effective rents on trophy product finished 2025 at $36.00 per square foot — actually exceeding asking rents of $35.71, a spread that signals genuine landlord pricing power in the top tier. Manhattan absorbed 15.6 million square feet during 2025, a historical best for the market. Blackstone’s acquisition of a 46 percent stake in 1345 Avenue of the Americas — a $1.4 billion transaction — was the institutional market’s clearest statement of conviction about where premium office product is headed.
Boston represents perhaps the most striking data point on the transaction side. Sold prices for office assets in Boston increased 131 percent year-over-year, according to Crexi’s analysis of Q3 2025 market activity. That is not a typo or a rounding artifact. It reflects the specific conditions that make Boston an outlier: a deeply employment-intensive ecosystem in life sciences, healthcare, and higher education; a transit-oriented urban form that actually supports consistent commuting; and a construction pipeline that is effectively closed. When the quality of existing supply is high and the pipeline is constrained, the institutions that want premium office know they are competing for a finite pool of assets, and pricing reflects that competition.
The average office sale price nationally increased 6.1 percent in 2025 to $182 per square foot — the first annual increase since 2021. That aggregate obscures the distribution, but the directional signal is real: the institutional buyers who have returned to the sector are paying up for conviction assets, and those transactions are pulling the average even while distressed commodity product continues to trade at steep discounts. Cap rates across the sector averaged 7.6 percent, creating legitimate current yield for investors willing to do the underwriting work to separate the trophy from the distressed.
Miami tells a more complicated story that illustrates the risks of misreading the bifurcation. Vacancy at 31.5 percent is the highest among major Sun Belt markets, yet effective rents of $34.83 per square foot rank second nationally behind Manhattan. The apparent contradiction resolves when you understand that Miami’s vacancy is heavily concentrated in lower-quality product, while trophy supply in Brickell and Downtown remains undersupplied relative to the demand generated by financial services relocations. The lesson for investors: market-level vacancy statistics can actively mislead if the submarket and quality tier composition is not disaggregated.
The Hybrid Work Settlement and What It Actually Means for Space
Three years into sustained return-to-office pressure, the market has arrived at something close to a stable equilibrium — one that looks different from both the optimistic projections of 2022 and the catastrophic narratives of 2023. Office attendance rebounded to approximately 70 percent of pre-pandemic levels by October 2025, according to data cited by multiple brokerage research teams. New York and Miami are among the markets nearest to full pre-pandemic attendance. Denver, San Francisco, and parts of the Pacific Northwest lag meaningfully behind.
The equilibrium is hybrid — but hybrid has become a specific thing, not a vague policy. Companies across sectors have settled into two to three in-office days per week as the operating standard, with more senior employees and more collaborative roles skewing toward higher attendance. The implications for space are twofold and working against each other simultaneously. On one hand, more bodies in the office on peak days requires more capacity to avoid overcrowding during Tuesday-through-Thursday crunch periods. On the other hand, the average square footage per employee has declined approximately 23 percent since 2019, as companies have redesigned their space around collaboration, hoteling, and activity-based working rather than assigned desks at 1:1 ratios. The net effect has been a footprint that is smaller in total square footage but more intentional in quality — smaller space in better buildings in better locations, configured specifically to support the collaborative work that companies can no longer do asynchronously.
More than one-third of respondents to CBRE’s Occupier Sentiment Survey indicated plans to increase their portfolio requirements over the next two years. That figure has been widely underreported in coverage that remains anchored to the distress narrative. It does not mean vacancy is going to fall quickly — there is too much legacy sublease space and too many lease restructurings still working through the system for a rapid reversal. But it does mean that the demand side is not in freefall. Companies adapting to hybrid work are not uniformly contracting. Many are rightsizing, which means reducing in some locations while expanding in others — specifically in the trophy tier of markets where they can attract and retain the talent they need.
The Supply Contraction Is the Most Underappreciated Dynamic
The office sector headlines have been so consistently negative that one of its most significant structural tailwinds has gone largely unacknowledged: new construction has effectively stopped. Cushman & Wakefield reported that Q4 2025 deliveries of 4 million square feet were the lowest quarterly total since 2012. The full-year 2026 pipeline is projected to hit a 25-year low. To put that in context, the ten-year average annual delivery of new office space was 44 million square feet. The 2026 forecast is a fraction of that.
This matters structurally because the office market’s oversupply problem is not a problem of too many good buildings. It is a problem of too many obsolete buildings that no tenant of quality wants to occupy. The buildings being constructed today — the small volume that is being constructed — are purpose-built for the post-pandemic demand profile. They are amenity-dense, technologically sophisticated, sustainably certified, and located in transit-accessible nodes. They are leasing before they deliver in most markets where they are being built.
The supply drought sets up a dynamic that parallels what BestCRE has documented in the industrial sector’s electrical spec premium: the gap between what tenants want and what the existing stock can deliver is not going to be closed by new construction in any near-term timeframe. Trophy availability is tightening in Midtown Manhattan, Downtown Miami, and Boston already. CBRE projects that prime vacancy will approach 8.2 percent nationally by 2027. When the next wave of occupier expansion demand materializes — supported by a labor market that may give employers more leverage to enforce presence requirements — the inventory capable of meeting that demand will be significantly thinner than the headline vacancy statistics suggest.
Conversion, Demolition, and the Shrinking of the Legacy Inventory
The other mechanism compressing the gap between supply and quality demand is the permanent removal of obsolete assets from the office inventory. Commercial Property Executive’s research estimates that over 250 million square feet of office space will be demolished or converted from inventory — a figure that will vastly outpace new construction over the same period. That is not a rounding error. It represents a structural reduction in the office stock that will reshape vacancy calculations materially over the next five to seven years.
Office-to-residential conversion has captured the most attention, driven by municipal incentives in cities trying to solve housing supply problems simultaneously with their office vacancy crises. New York, Washington D.C., Chicago, and Dallas have all implemented programs designed to accelerate conversions by reducing zoning friction and offering tax benefits. The economics remain challenging in many cases — older office buildings were not designed for residential use, and the cost of adding bathrooms, kitchens, and residential-grade HVAC to every floor often requires acquisition basis levels well below what sellers have historically been willing to accept. As distressed sales volume increases and pricing resets continue, more of these deals will pencil. The timeline is measured in years, not quarters, but the directional trend is clear.
Sublease availability, which peaked at approximately 237.9 million square feet nationally in mid-2023, had declined to 173.6 million square feet by the end of 2025 — a reduction of over 26 percent in two and a half years, according to Coy Davidson’s Q4 2025 analysis. That number matters because sublease space is the most immediate competitive pressure on direct landlords, and it has been declining consistently for ten consecutive quarters. As sublease terms expire and tenants either occupy or exit those obligations, the availability pool contracts without requiring any new leasing demand to drive it. The clearing of the sublease overhang is a prerequisite for any broader vacancy recovery, and that clearing is now meaningfully underway.
What AI Is Changing in Office Leasing and Underwriting
Artificial intelligence is entering the office market through two distinct channels that are worth separating analytically. The first is the occupier side: corporate real estate teams deploying AI-assisted workplace analytics are making materially better decisions about how much space they need, where they need it, and how to configure it. Occupancy sensing, badge data analysis, and utilization modeling are giving space planners real-time information about how their existing portfolios are performing — which floors are chronically empty on which days, which collaborative zones are oversubscribed, which locations are generating the attendance patterns that justify lease renewals. Companies with this data are rightsizing with precision rather than guessing.
The second channel is the investment side. AI platforms designed for CRE analysis are beginning to give office investors and developers access to submarket-level fundamental analysis that was previously the province of large institutional research teams. Vacancy trends at the building level, lease expiration waterfalls, effective rent trajectories by quality tier — these inputs are necessary for accurate underwriting in a market defined by bifurcation, and platforms that can synthesize them at scale are changing what it takes to be competitive. The 9AI Framework that BestCRE applies to evaluating CRE AI platforms pays particular attention to whether tools can parse quality-tier and submarket nuance, not just market-level abstractions. In the office sector, an analysis tool that cannot distinguish trophy from commodity in its outputs is worse than useless — it is actively misleading.
There is a separate AI-related dynamic worth watching on the demand side. The deployment of AI across knowledge-work industries — the primary tenant base for office space — has generated competing narratives. One argument holds that AI will reduce office-using headcount by automating analytical tasks, compressing the workforce that drives demand. The opposing argument holds that AI deployment requires more human oversight, more collaborative interpretation, and more cross-functional teaming than the tasks it replaces — all of which benefit from in-person proximity. The evidence through early 2026 suggests the second argument is closer to correct for the industries that occupy premium office space. Financial services, professional services, and technology companies have not reduced office requirements at the pace that AI-driven headcount reduction forecasts suggested they would. The reason is that AI has changed what the work is, but it has not eliminated the need for the humans doing it to be in the same room sometimes.
How Investors Should Be Reading This Market
The office market in 2026 rewards a level of analytical precision that most market commentary does not provide. Broad exposure to the sector is, as the industrial market analysis suggests about commodity product in that sector, a way to capture the distressed tail along with whatever recovery premium exists. The premium is real and it is available, but it is tightly circumscribed to specific asset quality tiers in specific submarkets — and identifying those submarkets correctly requires work that is not captured in any national headline vacancy figure.
The acquisition case for trophy product in core markets — Midtown Manhattan, Boston’s Seaport and Back Bay, Brickell in Miami, parts of Austin and Nashville where office-using employment growth has been sustained — is supported by the supply fundamentals. Competition for the right buildings in these markets has returned, institutional buyers are paying for conviction, and the pipeline will not produce meaningful new supply in any timeframe that competes with the existing stock. Investors buying at basis levels that reflect the distress narrative in a market where trophy fundamentals have already recovered are positioned for compression as the premium becomes more widely acknowledged.
The distressed opportunity in secondary quality product requires a different kind of discipline. Buying a Class B building in a market with 25 percent vacancy at a basis that reflects future conversion potential is not the same as buying a recovering trophy asset — it is a development bet, and it needs to be underwritten as one. The question is not whether the market will recover broadly enough to fill the building at market rents. It is whether the specific building, in its specific location, with its specific physical attributes, can be repositioned or converted in a way that justifies the all-in cost at the acquisition basis available. Many of these opportunities will not work. Some will generate exceptional returns. The difference is in the physical assessment and the conversion economics, not the macro narrative.
The parallel to the analysis in the data center sector is instructive: both sectors reward investors who understand that location has been redefined. In data centers, location now means power access more than geography. In office, location now means walkability, transit connectivity, and amenity density more than it means address prestige. The building that checked every institutional box in 2015 may be functionally obsolete in 2026 if it requires a car commute on a campus without restaurants or services. The building that was considered suburban and secondary may be fully competitive if it is in a walkable node where workers can combine commuting, lunch, errands, and social interaction in a single trip. Understanding the new geometry of what tenants value — and which specific assets sit at the intersection of that geometry — is where the analytical premium lives.
Return-to-office mandates, if they broaden and enforcement strengthens in a labor market that gives employers more leverage, represent the clearest upside scenario for office fundamentals broadly. Several large-cap employers — in finance, technology, and professional services — have moved to four and five-day requirements in specific markets. If that becomes more widespread and is sustained, the demand calculus changes meaningfully. The supply pipeline is not positioned to absorb a significant acceleration in demand, and markets with the strongest existing inventory of quality space would tighten rapidly. Investors with long-duration trophy positions in those markets would benefit most directly.
For investors also tracking the industrial sector’s bifurcation between power-ready and legacy assets, the structural parallel is worth sitting with. Both sectors are experiencing the same fundamental dynamic: tenants have raised their requirements, the existing stock cannot universally meet those requirements, and the gap between what works and what does not is not narrowing on its own. In office, the requirement is experiential and locational. In industrial, it is electrical and operational. In both cases, the asset that was adequate five years ago is no longer adequate today, and the capital that understands that distinction will outperform the capital that does not.
The Bifurcation Is the Investment Thesis
Office is not in recovery. Parts of it are recovering — meaningfully, with data to support genuine optimism — while other parts are in a secular decline that no cyclical upturn is going to reverse. The task for investors, brokers, and advisors is to stop treating those two realities as a single market and start underwriting them as the separate sectors they have effectively become.
The bifurcation is structural. It was created by a permanent shift in how knowledge workers relate to physical workspace, it is reinforced by a supply pipeline that will not deliver meaningful new trophy product in most markets for years, and it is widening as the gap between what tenants want and what legacy stock can offer continues to grow. Trophy assets in the right markets are already performing like functional landlord markets. Legacy assets in the wrong markets face a question not of when the cycle turns, but of whether the building has a viable future use that justifies the capital required to get there.
Navigating that distinction accurately is the entirety of the office opportunity in 2026. Everything else is noise.
BestCRE exists to map commercial real estate AI honestly — the platforms worth paying for, the ones you can replicate yourself, and the market forces shaping where capital is moving. Coverage spans 20 sectors and is evaluated through the 9AI Framework. If you’re deploying capital, advising clients, or building in CRE, this is the resource built for you.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does office market bifurcation mean in practice?
Bifurcation in the office market means the sector has split into two fundamentally different markets that no longer move together. Trophy Class A buildings in prime, amenity-rich, transit-accessible locations are experiencing tightening vacancy, rising effective rents, and strong institutional demand. Legacy Class B and C buildings — particularly those in suburban or transit-poor locations without competitive amenities — face structurally elevated vacancy that is unlikely to be resolved by any broad cyclical recovery. Investors, brokers, and tenants who analyze these as a single market will be systematically wrong in opposite directions depending on which tier they are looking at.
Which U.S. office markets are performing best in 2026?
Manhattan leads the national recovery with 15.6 million square feet absorbed in 2025, a historical best, while effective rents on trophy product exceeded asking rents — signaling genuine landlord pricing power. Boston has seen dramatic transaction price appreciation, driven by its life sciences and healthcare employment base and a nearly closed construction pipeline. Miami’s trophy submarket in Brickell commands some of the highest effective rents in the country despite elevated overall market vacancy. Dallas posted positive net absorption of 2.4 million square feet, driven by financial services growth. Markets struggling most include Portland, with CBD vacancy above 37 percent, and San Francisco, where the information sector headcount reductions have kept structural demand weak.
How is hybrid work reshaping office space demand in 2026?
Hybrid work has settled into a relatively stable equilibrium of two to three in-office days per week across most knowledge-work industries. Office attendance nationally has rebounded to approximately 70 percent of pre-pandemic levels. The demand effect is not a simple reduction in square footage — it is a redistribution toward quality. Companies are occupying smaller total footprints but investing more per square foot in the locations and buildings that can generate the attendance and collaboration outcomes they need. Average square footage per employee has declined approximately 23 percent since 2019, but the buildings capturing demand are commanding higher effective rents. The tenant that is downsizing from 100,000 square feet of commodity space to 75,000 square feet of trophy space is a loss in aggregate square footage but a win for trophy landlords.
What is driving office-to-residential conversions, and does the math work?
Office-to-residential conversions are being driven by the convergence of elevated office vacancy, severe housing supply shortfalls in major cities, and municipal policy that has reduced zoning friction and offered tax incentives to accelerate projects. The economics are challenging because older office buildings require extensive modification — bathrooms, kitchens, and residential HVAC systems on every floor — that can be prohibitively expensive at normal acquisition basis levels. As distressed sales volumes increase and pricing resets continue into the low $100s per square foot in some markets, more conversion projects will become financially viable. The timeline for meaningful inventory removal through conversions is measured in years, but the directional trend of reducing obsolete office supply is accelerating.
How should investors underwrite office assets differently in the bifurcated market?
The most important shift in office underwriting is treating trophy product and legacy commodity product as entirely separate asset classes with different demand drivers, different tenant profiles, and different fundamental trajectories. For trophy assets in core markets, the relevant underwriting questions are around supply pipeline tightening, submarket vacancy by quality tier, and tenant roll risk relative to market absorption rates — standard core underwriting adapted for a recovering landlord market. For legacy or distressed assets, the underwriting question is not when the market recovers enough to fill the building at market rents. It is whether the physical asset, in its specific location, can be repositioned or converted to a use with a viable economic future. Those are two very different analytical frameworks, and applying the wrong one to either asset type produces materially incorrect conclusions.
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